Early Reports From Scheme Liability Case Before The Supreme Court Today

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The sneaky plot to greatly expand corporate liability in securities laws class action suits looks like it might be in trouble

Thirteen years ago the Supreme Court ruled that companies could not be held liable for aiding and abetting fraud in private class action suits under securities laws. Regulators can bring actions for aiding and abetting, but private plaintiffs are restricted to suing the primary wrong-doer. Or, well, they were until trial lawyers invented a work-around called “scheme liability” for the restriction on their lawsuits.

The theory of scheme liability is that companies should be held liable for crimes committed by business partners if they played an integral part in the fraud. So if executives at a public company defraud shareholders by deceiving them, the shareholders would be able to sue not only the executives and the company but other companies who did business with them.

The Supreme Court today heard a case that will decide the fate of this clever ploy by trial lawyers to revive secondary liability. Apparently the advocates of scheme liability came in for some rough questioning. Unsurprisingly, Scalia didn’t like scheme liability. But Chief Justice John Roberts also reportedly had some harsh words for the theory, telling the lawyers that he believe the court should “get out of the business of expanding” shareholders rights.

If upheld, scheme liability could have a profound impact on the way Wall Street does business. Banks would be forced to regulate their corporate clients for compliance with securities laws. It would make the process of due diligence by Wall Street firms who lend money or put together deals for corporations far more time consuming and expensive. And, of course, when business deals go bad, it would inevitably open them up to lawsuits from the plaintiff’s bar and shakedowns for settlement payments.

For corporate America, scheme liability would create a duty to investigate the securities law compliance of potential business partners. “The costs of these preventative measures would be a hidden tax on the American economy and would affect our global competitiveness,” SEC commissioner Paul Atkins writes in today’s Wall Street Journal.

And, he might have added, it will ultimately harm the interests of shareholders by saddling companies with new legal costs at a time when they are already burdened by too much litigation. But, you know, scheme liability is advanced by advocates of “corporate investors” and in the name of “shareholders rights.” So your not supposed to notice that it damages shareholder’s interests.

Update: Peter Lattman at the WSJ's LawBlog has gone all "flood the zone" on the case. First, he comments on the PR spin of the plaintiff's bar. And files a report from a court observer who says that only two justices seemed sympathetic to the scheme liability theory. And, perhaps finally, delivers some interesting insights on who was asking the questions during the hearing.

Early Reports From Scheme Liability Scam Case [Associated Press]

Comments

Posted by Random Banker, Oct 09, 2007 3:55PM

Carney:

Of course the only problem is that the theory makes complete since.

First of all, the companies that commit these acts are usually so financially strapped that when they go bankrupt their will be little left for their shareholders.

Second, these companies are by definition committing fraud. You ever try to detect fraud by reading a 10k? I don't mean Enron style "creative accounting" but out and out fraud, Worldcom style like capitalizing operating expenses. There's is really no way for the average investor to detect this.

Thirdwise, Banks do not do due diligence. Trust me i'm the one responsible for doing it. We copy shit from one source and paste it into another. Seriously most of due diligence is literally formatting. No body actually verifies that any of the shit in the OM/Bank Book/ Prospectus or whatever information source you're actually using. I guess their were accountants looking at this shit at some point... I guess. As long as you can get the deal closed or syndicated then who cares, right?

If countreparties were actually held accountable when they perpetuate fraud its would nip a lot of this shit in the bud...yeah i just aid nip it in the bud. Maybe Qwest's bankers didn't know about their fraud but their PC suppliers did (i would explain this reference but if you really care look it up).

This is the same principal used for "down stream liability" in computer networks. If you have shitty security and leave your network unprotected and everyone connected to you gets hacked then YOU are liable.

Of course this shit (Scheme Liability) will never be upheld, it makes too much sense.

Posted by Fake Henry Kravis, Oct 09, 2007 4:13PM

I think a fair solution would be for only public companies to be liable under scheme liability.

Posted by Josh, Oct 09, 2007 4:45PM

No of course it does not make sense!

First, let us get references to Enron and Worldcom out of the way because the main perpetrators of that fraud are already incarcerated / dead. Certain affilliated third parties are also out of business, unjustifiably if I may add.

Now the case at hand is not about whether INTENTIONAL complicity in fraudulent schemes is punishable. Regulators have complete jurisdiction over such matters and are free to pursue any course of action against complicit third parties. So this is NOT about someone guilty going scot free.

This is about whether aggrieved investors of a certain firm can sue another firm for damages. This comes down to transfer of wealth from shareholders of the affiliate firm to the clearly guilty firm. Given that the shareholders of the bust firm knowingly made a WRONG decision, it doesnt make much sens that they should look for compensation from another firm or put the burden of due dilligence THEY should have performed on their investment onto an affiliate.

Also, the proposed scheme will make already ridiculous business interactions even more cumbersome. Taken to an extreme, I guess the next time you went to rent a car, Hertz would have to first check your criminal history and that of all people riding with you in the car and people you would be visiting as they could otherwise become party to some crime!

You said "If countreparties were actually held accountable when they perpetuate fraud " - the sad fact is that they already ARE answerable for any fraud to the regulators. The current case at hand is not about removing pre-existing accountability, it is about extending accountability to a whole new group. You somehow chose to ignore that fact.


Your 'downstream liability' example is ludicrous. Of course I get sued if my network security is shitty. But this scheme-liability concept would lead to everyone connecting to me (or associated to my network)also getting sued. That is exactly the point AGAINST scheme liability! Which side are you arguing for??

Posted by Anal_yst, Oct 09, 2007 4:47PM

@ Random Banker -

I agree with your basic assesment (esp the similarity to downstream liability in networks), but there are other ways to acomplish, i.e. incentivize companies not to perpetrate fraud. The scheme liability 'solution' esspentially serves mostly to thicken the wallets of securities and 'shareholder rights' lawyers, and other associated coffers.

Also, the accounting firms who are doing the audits, the real grunt work for the "diligence" should be (yea its a normative statement, bitch) picking up more of the fraud, earlier. Just look @ the Crazy eddie case, the freakin auditors (granted this was like 2 decades ago) were duped SOOOOO easily! (also its easier to blame it on the bean counters, not our problem, wooo)

Posted by Anal_yst, Oct 09, 2007 4:53PM

damnit josh, now I also have to agree moreso with you. Damn 10 minute post time!

Posted by Random Banker, Oct 09, 2007 5:25PM

Josh:

You're missing my point. The issue is not when third parties are unaware fraud but when they complicit in it. For example in cases of "channel stuffing" or "parking assets" in order to inflate revenue or produce an artificial increase in earnings or cash flow (that is the case with Charter currently before the supreme court). In cases like these the counter parties are complicit, that is the whole point.

you say:
"Your 'downstream liability' example is ludicrous. Of course I get sued if my network security is shitty. But this scheme-liability concept would lead to everyone connecting to me (or associated to my network)also getting sued."

think of it as down balance sheet liability

You are a receivables or payables counter party of a company and your income is relatively secured through contract or assets. ( set top box manufacturers in the case of Charter which is currently before the supreme court) You help the company commit fraud also profiting yourself. The shareholders down balance sheet from you are adversely effected by your complicity in the company's undisclosed and fraudulent activity. In affect you (the countrer party) are profiting by defrauding the primary companies' share holders. The only issue here is that the company's management is complicit so the share holders have to sue the counter party directly.

If management wasn't complicit and these same counterparties tried to defraud the primary companies share holders would they get sued then? Yes.

Posted by Fake John Bogel, Oct 09, 2007 6:02PM

Could we use scheme liability to siphon money away from financial services firms, thereby bringing their profits in line with the rest of American business?

Posted by Bulging Bracket, Oct 09, 2007 6:10PM

Private courses of action for shareholders of criminal companies are bad. It creates moral hazard and reduces the incentives for shareholders to be skeptical of what management has to say. Rewarding lazy and negligent shareholders at the expense shareholders in another company is worse than the suits by investors against their management and insurers for stock fraud.

The best idea to improve oversight and corporate governance is to shoot law school grads, especially those in the mold of Millberg Weiss.

Posted by touche, Oct 09, 2007 7:38PM

Not having private courses of action for shareholders of criminal companies is bad. Asymmetric information creates moral hazard and reduces the incentives for shareholders to provide capital to growing businesses.

Posted by josh, Oct 09, 2007 8:09PM

Random Banker,

You are repeatedly beating around the bush and avoiding the fundamental issue. The case at hand is NOT about whether the third party is guilty and a negative judgement for the plaintiffs DOES NOT mean that third parties will always go scot free.

Third parties are still very much under the jurisdiction of the regulators and cannot escape legal action initiated against them by the regulators if some wrongdoing is suspected.

So fundamentally the case is not about guilty parties escaping punishment. Hence all the 'shit getting nipped in the bud' talk is meaningless and uninformed.

It is about transfer of wealth from one shareholder to another, with the tort bar taking its cut in between. In the end, the net loss is for the shareholders and the net gain is for the bar.

What about the Motorola shareholders? Their company committed no accounting crime. Yet your suggestion seems to be that their money should be handed over to the Charter shareholders (the guilty firm) and the trial bar. How on earth is it fair to them?

This is just a continuation of the 'shift-the-blame' game. Hot coffe burnt your mouth? Must be McDonald's fault for not telling you that the coffee is hot.

IF you invest in a fundamentally flawed company, tough luck. You mistake. The current case is an attempt at perverse socialism to minimize one investor's loss at the cost of anohter investor who might have actually invested in a totally sound company.

And you went off on a tangent in trying to explain the network security thing. Let me tell you what will happen if this scheme liability thing is allowed.

Remember the TJ Max credit card heist? Basically they maintained lax network protocols which enables hackers to steal credit card information. Of course TJ Max was sued.

With 'scheme-liability', along with TJ max Visa/Mastercard/Amex/Discover would be sued (for not supervising TJ Max networks), Citi/BofA/CapitalOne/Chase would all be sued for not supervicing Visa/MC/Amex/Disc's supervision of TJ Max, Cisco/Avaya whoever provided the network equipment would be sued for not superviding proper usage of the equipment by TJ Max, whoever provided the software would be sued for not ensuring that TJ Max bought the latest and best security software and ............

I am completely unable to see how such a tort lovefest would be beneficial to anyone (other that tort lawyers). So if you are one, I get your point. If not, go examine the case in detail before you comment.

Posted by Random Banker, Oct 09, 2007 8:51PM

Josh:

All of the arguments you're making were also made against insider trading laws. People thought they would discourage people from raising capital in the public markets by shifting liability on to owners. But of course the laws, while not eliminating insider trading, created greater transparency and made more more millionaires not fewer.

What the fuck are you talking about Motorola committed no "accounting" crime? They helped perpetuate a fraud. That is a crime in an of itself, even if it isn't on your balance sheet.

I fully agree with the every man for himself investment philosophy, but only up to the point were people start committing fraud. The more costly you make assisting fraud to counterparties and people with non public access/information the more instances of fraud you eliminate. This is simply a matter of properly alligning incentives for third parties.

I don't trust regulators to really do anything Josh and I'm sure you don't either. And in the world of finance where huge financial incentives are aligned against an apathetic staff of government flunkies that proves doubly so. All I am saying is that shareholders need the tools to properly cure corporate malfeasance which takes advantage of information asymmetry. This why insider trading is now illegal after all, in order to that capital is deployed in a more optimal and efficient manner.

Posted by Josh, Oct 09, 2007 9:35PM

"All of the arguments you're making were also made against insider trading laws."

When the hell did I argue again accounting fraud laws? They already exist. I thought were were discussing 'shceme-liability', a tort bar brainchild.

What the fuck are you talking about Motorola committed no "accounting" crime?

Motorola is regulated by a hundred different entities out there. How many times do I have to scream, IF THERE IS A CRIME THEM THERE ARE ALREADY A ZILLION WAYS OF PROSECUTING MOTOROLA. This case is not about addressing a crime (if any) but granting new people jurisdiction for ACCUSING (that is what lawsuits are about) Motorola of crimes that it is already accountable for.

I don't trust regulators to really do anything

And you freaking trust leading luminaries of the tort bar like Bill Lerach Mel Weiss and company (convicted felons if I may add)? Are you even making sense to yourself right now?

All I am saying is that shareholders need the tools to properly .... random crap

What can I say. Too bad that there is too long a freaking line at the car service because of the rain and seamless is down. It is meaningless arguing with someone who wont even stay on point. Yet to hear back on the 'network liability' example.

And who the fuck argued against insider trading laws? Its been there ever since the SEC was created in 1934!!!

Posted by Random Banker, Oct 09, 2007 10:29PM

Josh:

Those drifts off subject, those are analogies.

Shareholders DO need the tools to properly cure corporate malfeasance which takes advantage of information asymmetry. That is the whole fucking point of the case as far as I'm concerned. So the fact that you think its random crap is the reason we can't see eye to eye on this.

Speaking of OFF THE SUBJECT:
Trial lawyers and tort reform are off the subject as far as I'm concerned.

But yes since you want to talk about that, I do trust them to police business more than regulator. And yes businesses need to be policed because the market does effectively asses penalties for fraud.

Trial lawyer are market participants. They don't have any interest in investing huge amount of money trying a case that they have a low probability of winning. They help keep businesses honest by increasing penalties associated with externalities.

Posted by Josh, Oct 10, 2007 9:14AM

Trial lawyers and tort reform are off the subject

Dude, scheme liability is ABOUT the tort bar. If that is off topic, why are you even commenting on this issue???

They don't have any interest in investing huge amount of money trying a case that they have a low probability of winning. They help keep businesses honest

I really have no idea what your connection with the tort bar is but the conceit is fatal.

Of course they know the probability of winning is very low, in most cases because there is nothing to win! Do go and read up on the entire history of Milberg-Weiss. It is called a shake-down operation.

The whole idea is not winning. Challenging even baseless class action suits is so expensive that companies settle whether they are at fault or not. Where were you all these days? The idea is hardly to keep business honest. It is to enrich the tort bar at the expense of shareholders.

And once again, if we need the tort bar to keep business honest, maybe we should start with abolishing the mega huge structure consisting of the SEC and gazillion other regulators. What the hell are they there for?

And going back to the initial point, it is not about keeping business honest. Enron/Worldcom/all the recent insider trading jobs were all taken down by the existing regulatory structure. It works and is alive and kicking.

Shareholders do need tools and HAVE the tools. The case at hand is about who is a shareholder and whose share does he hold. So if TJ Max had a data heist, does a TJ Max shareholder automatically become a shareholder of each and every company ever associated with TJ Max?

That is the question, and not whether
a TJ Max shareholder has tools to deal with TJ Max. He already has those. Evidently you dont even get the basic premise.

Posted by Random Banker, Oct 10, 2007 1:08PM

Josh:

I understand the premise you dumb ass. I just disagree with your interpretation. Yes share holders should have the right to a pursue a company that aids in and profits from defrauding their company.

Look man you have some huge problem with trial lawyers. Personally I don't have any problem with them. As I said the serve a function. I didn't say that the odds of them winning a case needed to be over 50% for them to take it. Just that simple profit seeking behavior on their part drive them to take more cases with a 30% chance than those with a 1% chance.

My friend you've let your irrational fear of trial lawyers cloud your ability to independently evaluate any subject in which they're involved.

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